Recasting the Dublin Regulation : an analysis of the impact of the M.S.S. and N.S./M.E. judgments on the recast of the Dublin Regulation by Petersson, Catherine
  
 
 
 
 
 
Recasting the Dublin Regulation 
An analysis of the impact of the M.S.S. and N.S./M.E. judgments on the 
recast of the Dublin Regulation 
 
Catherine Petersson 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Avdelningen för mänskliga rättigheter 
Historiska institutionen 
Kurskod: MRSK60 
Termin: Höstterminen 2013 
Handledare: Olof Beckman & Lina Sturfelt 
       Antal ord: 14968
 
 
 
1 
Abstract 
The purpose of the Dublin Regulation is to ensure that applications for asylum will be 
considered by one Member State, avoiding the phenomena of “asylum shopping” and 
“refugees in orbit”. The Regulation consists of a hierarchy of criteria for determining 
the responsible state, however, this has also resulted in the principle of Mutual Trust 
between Member States, where all states are presumed to have the same levels of 
human rights by virtue of EU membership. Additionally, the Regulation also places a 
disproportionate amount of responsibility on the Member States that were the first point 
of entry into the EU. In 2011, two judgments were delivered by the ECtHR and the 
CJEU. These cases illustrated the consequences Mutual Trust can have on the principle 
of non-refoulement.  
In the redrafting, it was hoped that the Dublin-III Regulation, which came into 
force in 2013, would reflect the significance of these cases. This paper looks at how the 
judgments impacted the recast of the Regulation, and what effect this had on the 
concept of Mutual Trust within the EU. This paper is a conceptual analysis of the two 
judgments, and a comparison between the Dublin-II and the Dublin-III. However, while 
new safeguards were put into place, the fundamental flaws of disproportionate 
responsibility sharing remain in the system. Through looking at David Miller’s theory 
on national responsibility and remedial responsibility, I argue that the focus in 
allocating responsibility should be based on a state’s capacities and on asylum seekers 
ties to specific states. 
 
Key words: burden of Proof, burden Sharing, Common European Asylum System, The 
Dublin Regulation, Dublin-II, Dublin-III, Hierarchy of Criteria, M.S.S., Mutual Trust, 
Non-refoulement, N.S./M.E., remedial responsibility, sovereignty clause, early warning 
mechanism 
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Syftet med Dublinförordningen är att se till att asylansökningar behandlas av endast en 
medlemsstat, för att undvika fenomenen “asylsum shopping” och “refugees in orbit”. 
Förordningen består av en hierarki av kriterier för att fastställa vilken stat som är 
ansvarig, men detta har också lett till principen om ömsesidigt förtroende mellan 
medlemsstaterna, där alla stater förutsätts ha samma nivå av mänskliga rättigheter på 
grund av sitt EU medlemskap. Dessutom lägger förordningen också en oproportionerligt 
stor del av ansvaret på de medlemsstater som är inträdesstater till EU. Under 2011 kom 
två domslut från ECtHR och CJEU domstolarna. Dessa fall illustrerade vilka 
konsekvenser principen om ömsesidigt förtroende kan få för principen om non-
refoulement. 
I det nya utkastet, hoppades man att Dublin-III förordningen, som trädde i kraft 
2013, skulle återspegla betydelsen av dessa fall. Denna uppsats handlar om hur de två 
domsluten påverkade omarbetningen av förordningen, och vilken effekt det hade på 
begreppet ömsesidigt förtroende inom EU. Denna uppsats är en begreppsanalys av 
dessa två domslut, och en jämförelse mellan Dublin-II och Dublin-III 
förordningarna. Men samtidigt som nya säkerhetsåtgärder sattes på plats, är de 
grundläggande bristerna med oproportionerlig ansvarsfördelning fortfarande kvar i 
systemet. Genom att analysera David Millers teori om nationellt ansvar och avhjälpande 
ansvar, menar jag att ansvaret bör fördelas baserat på staters kapacitet och asylsökandes 
band till vissa stater. 
  
Nyckelord: bevisbörda, bördefördelning, Gemensamma Europeiska Asylsystemet, 
Dublinförordningen, Dublin-II, Dublin-III, hierarki av kriterier, MSS, ömsesidigt 
förtroende, Non-refoulement, N.S./M.E., avhjälpande ansvar, suveränitetsklausulen, 
övervakningssystem 
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 Abbreviations 
CEAS Common European Asylum System 
CJEU The Court of Justice of the European Union 
EASO European Asylum Support Agency (EU agency) 
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights 
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights 
EU European Union 
EURODAC European Dactyloscopy (EU fingerprint database for identifying 
asylum seekers) 
M.S.S. M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (judgment given by ECtHR) 
N.S./M.E. N.S. v Secretary of State for the Home Department and M.E., 
A.S.M., M.T., K.P., E.H. v Refugee Applications Commissioner, 
Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform (UK and Ireland) 
UK United Kingdom 
UNHCR The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
5 
1 Introduction 
The European Union is well known for freedom of movement between member states. 
With the Schengen agreement, passport controls between Member States were 
abolished in a majority of the EU states. This gave EU citizens an increased freedom of 
movement. However, this resulted in restricted controls for third country nationals. 
Initially, the European Commission saw a potential problem with the acceptance of 
asylum seekers. It was recognized that since EU citizens would be able to move freely 
within the EU, so would third country nationals, including asylum seekers.1 
 The Commission wanted to prevent the occurrence of two phenomena: 
“asylum shopping” and “refugees in orbit”. “Asylum shopping” meant that without 
internal borders, asylum seekers would be able to travel to and apply for asylum in 
multiple Member States, thereby increasing chances of receiving protection. “Refugees 
in orbit” meant that without internal borders, member states would avoid taking 
responsibility for asylum applications, potentially “bouncing” asylum seekers between 
states, no one ever taking responsibility for processing the application. The Commission 
decided to put into place a method of designating responsibility for processing asylum 
applications, in order to prevent the occurrence of these phenomena.2 
For this reason, the Dublin Convention was put into place. This was the 
original document, and the predecessor to the Dublin Regulation. Its main purpose was 
to guarantee the processing of asylum applications by delegating responsibility to one 
Member State. The Convention was designed with a hierarchical ranking of criteria, in 
order to determine the responsible Member State. It was signed in June 1990 and came 
into force in 1997.3 The Convention marks the beginning of a Common European 
Asylum System (CEAS). The hierarchical mechanism for allocating responsibility has 
                                                
1 Nicol, Andrew, “From Dublin Convention to Dublin Regulation: A Progressive Move” in Baldaccini, 
2 Guild, Elspeth (red.), The Developing Immigration and Asylum Policies of the European Union: 
Adopted Conventions, Resolutions, Recommendations, Decisions and Conclusions, Kluwer, The Hague, 
1996, p. 113. 
3 Guild, 1996, p. 113. 
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received much critique for putting a disproportionate amount of pressure on Member 
States that make up the border of the EU.4 
The Convention presented some significant drawbacks, and the Dublin-II 
Regulation (Dublin-II) replaced it in 2003.5 However, the new regulation did not solve 
the fundamental issues of the convention, as it retained the basic structure and rules laid 
down.6 Two new criteria in relation to unaccompanied minors and family reunification 
were added.7 It also solved some of the procedural problems that had been created by 
time constraints.8 One of the biggest changes with the Regulation came with the Treaty 
of Amsterdam, which gave the EU courts jurisdiction over the regulation. This meant 
that asylum seekers now had a way for their legal issues to be heard by the courts.9 
However, in 2008, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
advised Member States to refrain from returning asylum seekers to Greece under the 
Dublin Regulation.10 
The Commission once again proposed amendments to the Regulation in 2008.11 
Research in the field shows that it was hoped an important verdict, M.S.S. v Belgium 
and Greece (hereafter M.S.S.), given by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
in 2011, would have an impact on the Dublin-III Regulation (Dublin-III), which came 
into force 19th July 2013.12 One of the important changes that came with the new 
regulation is a paragraph that prohibits member states from transferring if there is risk 
of human rights violations.13 The new regulation also put into place a monitoring 
                                                
4 Bacic, Nika, “Asylum Policy in Europe – The Competences of the European Union and Inefficiency of 
the Dublin System”, 8:8 Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy (2011), p. 72. 
5 Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms 
for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the 
Member States by a third-country national, OJ L50/1, 25 Feb 2003, (hereafter the Dublin-II Regulation). 
6 Da Lomba, Sylvie, The Right to Seek Refugee Status in the European Union, Intersentia, Antwerp, 
2004, p. 131.                                                                                                                                                                                                        
7 Da Lomba, 2004, p. 134. 
8 Da Lomba, 2004, p. 139. 
9 Nicol, 2007, p. 271. 
10 Bacic, 2011, 62. 
11 Bacic, 2011, p. 53. 
12 Moreno-Lax, Violeta, “Dismantling the Dublin System: M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece”, 1:31 
European Journal of Migration Law 14 (2012), pp. 28-31. 
13 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 
establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an 
application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or 
a stateless person (recast), OJ L180/31, 29 June 2013, (hereafter the Dublin-III Regulation), art. 3(2). 
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system, to detect problems with the asylum procedures in Member States from early 
on.14  
1.1 Summary of the Judgments 
Two judgments from 2011 have been viewed as landmark cases highlighting the 
inadequacies of the Dublin system, and the issues caused by Mutual Trust, which is the 
concept that all Member States view each other as safe states, with equal protection 
levels and access to asylum procedures. The judgement of M.S.S.15 and the joined case 
of N.S. v Secretary of State for the Home Department and M.E., A.S.M., M.T., K.P., 
E.H. v Refugee Applications Commissioner, Minister for Justice, Equality and Law 
Reform (hereafter N.S./M.E.)16 highlighted the inadequacies of the system, and the 
issues of Mutual Trust. Both cases concern transfers to Greece.17 
The judgment of M.S.S. was given by the ECtHR on 21st January 2011. 
Following this ruling all transfers to Greece were halted as it became apparent that 
Greece was unable to handle the increasing pressures from immigration.18 This case is 
not an isolated incident; it highlights a fundamental issue with the Dublin System: that 
more often than not, the responsibility for processing an application for asylum falls on 
the state that was the point of entry into the EU for the asylum seeker. These states, such 
as Italy, Malta and Greece, are geographically located closest to the border, and have 
disproportionate amounts of pressure placed on their asylum systems.19 
In M.S.S., an Afghani national was transferred by Belgium to Greece, under 
the Dublin-II. He entered the EU through Greece in 2008 before travelling to Belgium 
in 2009 and applying for asylum. Belgium requested Greece to take over the asylum 
application, and despite poor conditions for asylum seekers in Greece, Belgium ordered 
the applicant to be transferred. Although Greece had not replied within the two-month 
                                                
14 Dublin-III, art. 33. 
15 ECtHR, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, 21 January 2011, appl. no. 30696/09, (hereafter M.S.S.). 
16 CJEU, Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, N.S. v Secretary of State for the Home Department and M.E., 
A.S.M., M.T., K.P., E.H. v Refugee Applications Commissioner, Minister for Justice, Equality and Law 
Reform, 21 December 2011, (hereafter N.S./M.E.). 
17 Brouwer, Evelien, “Mutual Trust and the Dublin Regulation: Protection of Fundamental Rights in the 
EU and the Burden of Proof”, 9:1 Utrecht Law Review (2013), p. 135. 
18 Mallia, Patricia, “Case of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece: A Catalyst in the Re-Thinking of the Dublin 
II Regulation”, 30:3 Refugee Survey Quarterly (2011), pp. 107-110. 
19 Nicol, 2007, pp. 265-267. 
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period set out in the Dublin-II, Belgium argued that it was not the responsible state.20 
Belgium claimed that they had no reason to believe Greece would not honour their 
obligations (Mutual Trust).21 Despite lodging an appeal and arguing that he would be 
detained in poor conditions and feared being returned to Afghanistan, where an attempt 
on his life had been made by the Taliban,22 Belgium transferred him to Greece.23 
 The applicant argued that his conditions of detention and living conditions in 
Greece were a violation of article 3 of the European Convention of Human Rights 
(ECHR), which prohibits inhumane and degrading treatment.24 He also argued violation 
of article 2, the right to life, and article 13, the right to an effective remedy.25 The court 
ruled that there was a violation of article 3 by Greece and Belgium. There was also a 
violation of article 13 by both countries. Both Belgium and Greece were ordered to pay 
fines of compensation to the applicant.26 
The second judgment, N.S./M.E. is actually two cases joined for the 
proceedings against the United Kingdom and Ireland, and was given by the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on the 21st December 2011. N.S., an Afghani 
national, entered the EU through Greece in September 2008 and was arrested and 
detained by the authorities. He was unable to make an application for asylum. After 
attempting to leave Greece, he was arrested and expelled to Turkey. He escaped 
detention in Turkey and arrived in the UK January 2009, where he lodged an 
application for asylum. The Secretary of State for the Home Department of the UK 
requested Greece to take responsibility for the application under the Dublin-II. When 
Greece failed to respond, the UK took this an acceptance of responsibility. In July 2009 
the applicant was notified that he would be transferred to Greece, which he argued was 
a violation of his rights. However, the UK claimed this was unfounded since Greece 
was on the list of safe countries. The applicant sought judicial review, and his transfer 
                                                
20 M.S.S., paras. 9-14. 
21 M.S.S., para. 17. 
22 M.S.S., para 267. 
23 M.S.S., paras. 27, 31, and 33. 
24 M.S.S., para. 205. 
25 M.S.S., paras. 265, 266, and 323. 
26 M.S.S., paras. 1-17, pp. 88-9. 
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was annulled.27 The case was then examined by the High Court of Justice (England and 
Wales), who referred seven questions on the application of the Dublin-II to the CJEU28 
In M.E. and others, five separate individuals from Afghanistan, Iran and 
Algeria travelled through Greece and were each arrested for illegal entry. They then 
travelled to Ireland and applied for asylum. Three of the two applied without admitting 
they had been in Greece. However, through the EURODAC system it was determined 
that all of the applicants had entered Greece but none claimed asylum there. All five 
applicants resisted transfer to Greece, arguing that procedures and conditions for asylum 
seekers in Greece were inadequate and that Ireland should take responsibility.29 The 
High Court referred two questions on the application of the Dublin-II to the CJEU for 
preliminary ruling.30 
The CJEU delivered on both these cases simultaneously as the questions for 
review were similar. The questions concern the application of article 3(2) of the Dublin-
II, the “Sovereignty Clause”.31 The main question was whether the transferring member 
state was obliged to assess the conditions of the receiving state in regards to access to 
asylum procedures and protection. Secondly, if the receiving member state was not in 
compliance with its obligations, did it then fall on the transferring state to take 
responsibility for the application?32 The CJEU adopted a similar position to that of the 
ECtHR in M.S.S., referring to the case as precedent.33  
1.2 Problem formulation, aim and questions 
The aim of this paper is to analyse the impact of the two judgments, M.S.S. and 
N.S./M.E, on the recast of the Dublin Regulation. The Dublin-III incorporated new 
mechanisms, which will be examined in the course of this paper. The main changes in 
the Dublin-III that I will focus on are the expanded and amended sovereignty clause, 
which created new obligations for Member States in assessing the situation prior to 
                                                
27 N.S./M.E., paras. 34-42. 
28 N.S./M.E., para. 50. 
29 N.S./M.E., paras. 51-2. 
30 N.S./M.E., para. 53. 
31 N.S./M.E., paras. 55, 70-74, 109, and 116. 
32 N.S./M.E., para. 53. 
33 N.S./M.E., para. 88-90, and 112. 
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transfers,34 and the new “mechanism for early warning, preparedness and crisis 
management”.35 I will also examine the hierarchy of criteria, which is central to the 
Dublin system as it is the mechanism used to allocate responsibility. A main theme 
throughout this paper is the presumption of Mutual Trust throughout the EU, and how 
the judgments and the redrafting of the Regulation have affected this concept. I aim to 
show that while the changes to the system are a step forward, the redraft detracts away 
from the more fundamental redesign of the Regulation that is needed. The main 
question to be answered in this thesis is: 
• What impact did the two judgments, M.S.S. and N.S./M.E., have on the recast of 
the Dublin Regulation, and how does this come to bear on the rights of asylum 
seekers and the concept of Mutual Trust within the EU? 
1.3 Material and Restrictions 
1.3.1 Primary Material 
The primary sources used throughout this paper consist of the two versions of the 
Dublin Regulation, the previous Dublin-II and the current Dublin-III. The Dublin 
Regulation is part of the legislation of the CEAS. The text of both these documents will 
make up part of the primary material. I have chosen not to include the original 
Convention because it was not within the jurisdiction of the EU courts, and because the 
changes to the Dublin-II were not significant enough to add any substantial 
understanding to this paper. Including the Convention would not have enhanced the 
investigation. Additionally, the main focus in this paper is the impact of the two 
judgments from 2011, during the time the Dublin-II was in force. The Convention is not 
relevant here and outside the focus of the paper. 
Article 3(2) of the Regulation previously stated that a Member State may 
process an application for which they are not the responsible, but it did not make it clear 
when it would be necessary to do so, nor did it impose any positive obligation.36 In the 
current Regulation, article 3(2) has been expanded and clarified. It now states that while 
the first member state where an application was lodged should be responsible if no other 
                                                
34 Dublin-III, art. 3(2). 
35 Dublin-III, art. 33. 
36 Dublin-II, art. 3(2). 
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state can be determined on the basis of the criteria, there are some restrictions. The 
paragraph enforces a prohibition against Member States transferring to a second state if 
there is a risk of inhumane or degrading treatment.37 An early warning mechanism was 
also added to the Regulation, which provides a mechanism for prevention and crisis 
management of problems with Member States’ asylum systems.38 
Additional primary material consists of two EU court judgements on the 
application of the Dublin-II. The first judgment, M.S.S., was given by the ECtHR on the 
21st January 2011. Another important judgement, a joined case for the purposes of the 
proceedings, N.S./M.E. was given by the CJEU on the 21st of December 2011. These 
two judgments differ in more than one way. The first verdict, M.S.S., was given after 
the applicant had been returned to Greece and found his rights were violated.39 The 
second case, N.S./M.E. was given after M.S.S., and is in response to preliminary 
questions from the UK and Ireland on the application of the Dublin-II, prior to 
transferring asylum seekers to Greece.40 
 I have limited myself to the use of these two judgements on the application of 
the Dublin-II because these have been viewed as landmark judgements, bringing the 
insufficiencies of the system to light and as potential catalysts for change.41 With these 
cases it was made clear that the idea of mutual trust within the EU is not feasible 
anymore. Such judgments have made clear that through the principle of Mutual Trust, 
the Dublin-II was unable to prevent refoulement.42 While transfers to Greece have been 
halted since the judgements, the newer text of the Dublin-III is based on the same 
principles as its predecessor. 
1.3.2 Secondary Material 
For my selection of secondary material, the most important sources I have used are 
articles from peer-reviewed journals, which discuss the importance of the two 
judgments, M.S.S. and NS/ME. These articles, discussed in Chapter 3, “Earlier 
Research”, present academic views on these judgments and the Dublin Regulation. 
                                                
37 Dublin-III, art. 3(2). 
38 Dublin-III, art. 33. 
39 M.S.S., paras. 33-42. 
40 N.S./M.E., paras. 50 and 53. 
41 Brouwer, 2013, p. 135. 
42 Mallia, 2011, pp. 125-6. 
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These sources reflect the significance of the judgments and their impact on the 
redrafting of the Dublin Regulation, as well as the situation for asylum seekers in the 
EU. While many articles were written prior to the Dublin-III entering into force, it is 
now interesting to see how the judgments have affected the new regulation. Authors 
who have written articles on the impact of the judgments include: Patricia Mallia, 
Violeta Moreno-Lax, Cathryn Costello, Evelien Brouwer, Juha Ratio and Nica Bacic. 
Some newer books do have chapters dedicated to the more recent events and changes in 
the Dublin Regulation, such as Juha Ratio’s chapter “A Few Remarks to Evaluate the 
Dublin System and the Asylum Acquis”, in The Future of Asylum in the European Union: 
Problems, Proposals and Human Rights (2011). 
 I have used a variety of books that discuss the topic of the CEAS in general, 
and the issue of mutual trust and shortcomings of the Dublin System. These books 
function as a good background for the subject and illustrate the issues that were brought 
about with the original Convention, as well as its successor. I have used these books to 
explain in brief the history of the Dublin Regulation. Some earlier books, such as 
Elspeths Guild’s The Developing Immigration and Asylum Policies of the European 
Union: Adopted Conventions, Resolutions, Recommendations, Decisions and 
Conclusions (1996) were useful in looking at the reasons why the Dublin System was 
established. Additional books include, Sylvie Da Lomba’s The Right to Seek Refugee 
Status in the European Union (2004), Andrew Nicol’s “From Dublin Convention to 
Dublin Regulation: A Progressive Move” in Whose Freedom, Security and Justice?: EU 
Immigration and Asylum law and Policy (2007), and Agnès Hurwitz’s The Collective 
Responsibility of States to Protect Refugees (2009). 
The primary sources that are the focus of this thesis are all official European 
Union sources available to the public. This means that the information is not sensitive 
and is intended for public use. The two judgments, M.S.S., and N.S./M.E. do not 
disclose the identities of the applicants. The names of the applicants are omitted, and no 
information is given which could identify the applicants or is otherwise sensitive. 
Additionally, the majority of sources I have used are published books and journal 
articles. I have not used a lot of other types of sources, such as NGO reports, because 
the topic of this thesis is judicial and so the primary sources consist of official legal 
documents and the majority of secondary sources are published books or peer-reviewed 
articles written by academics in the field of law.   
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2 Theory and Method 
2.1 Theory: David Miller  
In this section I will present the theoretical views of David Miller on the topic of global 
justice and national responsibility. The issue of collective responsibility and identifying 
and allocating responsibility is central to Miller’s book National Responsibility and 
Global Justice (2007). Not just responsibility for protecting refugees and processing the 
claims of asylum seekers, but also the responsibility of richer nations to aid the world’s 
poor, and even the collective responsibility of nations in rectifying past wrong-doings, 
such as colonialism.43 The concept of allocating responsibility is relevant to the issue of 
burden sharing. Miller argues that citizens of a nation can be held collectively 
responsible for past wrongs or even situations where they have the ability to act, by 
virtue of a shared identity.44 Miller argues that “national responsibility, clearly, is a 
species of collective responsibility: individuals share in it only by virtue of their 
membership of those large communities we call nations”.45  
Central to Miller’s work is the importance of viewing individuals as both 
agents and patients. As agents, people are able to make choices and can also be held 
responsible for their actions, but as patients they can be subject to certain situations and 
circumstances beyond their control.46 Miller defines two types of responsibility: 
outcome responsibility and remedial responsibility. Outcome responsibility views 
people as agents, who can take responsibility for the results of their actions. However, 
remedial responsibility views people as patients and asks who should take on the burden 
of aiding those whose rights have been violated.47 Remedial responsibility is important 
to the Dublin Regulation and the allocation of responsibility for asylum-seekers within 
the EU, as the issue we are trying to solve is essentially ‘who should take on the 
remedial responsibility for each asylum seeker, and in what way should we determine 
this responsibility?’ A procedure for determining this is necessary. Miller’s theory on 
                                                
43 Miller, David, National responsibility and global justice, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007. 
44 Miller, 2007, pp. 111-114. 
45 Miller, 2007, p. 81. 
46 Miller, 2007, p. 5. 
47 Miller, 2007, p. 81. 
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identifying remedial responsibility highlights the different ways we can allocate 
responsibility to remedy a situation.48 
 Miller explains that because remedial responsibility can only work if someone 
is willing to accept it, it becomes difficult to allocate, and even well meaning actors may 
not take on responsibility. Remedial responsibility is a special responsibility that has to 
be identified and allocated to the individual(s) best able to fulfil the obligation. Miller 
argues that societies need to have mechanisms in place to identify and assign 
responsibility.49 The Dublin Regulation is essentially such a mechanism for allocating 
remedial responsibility, whether or not it is an efficient and fair mechanism.  
 Miller proposes a “connection theory” of remedial responsibility, where an 
actor who is linked to the harmed person in one of six ways can be considered 
remedially responsible. The first three ways correspond to forms of responsibility and 
the second three ways correspond more to the relationship of the agent to the patient’s 
situation. Some focus on moral reasons, whereas others merely pick out the agent who 
is best suited for non-moral reasons to provide the remedy.50 Miller also points out that 
none of the types of connection have priority over the others, instead the justification is 
the need to remedy the situation and to identify the agent responsible to do so.51 The six 
ways of allocating remedial responsibility as identified by Miller are: 
1. Moral Responsibility: The agent who is morally responsible for someone’s 
condition is also remedially responsible for it. To be considered morally 
responsible for someone’s condition, the agent must have acted in a way that 
was morally wrong, causing the situation.52 
2. Outcome Responsibility: An actor can be outcome responsible for someone’s 
condition without being morally responsible for it. This could occur if the action 
that was the cause was morally neutral or even justified. The actor who is 
outcome responsible can take on remedial responsibility if he is also responsible 
for rectifying the situation. Miller argues that there is a moral reason for doing 
this. If we gain benefits from our actions, we should also bear the costs. If the 
                                                
48 Miller, 2007, pp. 100-104. 
49 Miller, 2007, pp. 98-9. 
50 Miller, 2007, p. 99. 
51 Miller, 2007, p. 100. 
52 Miller, 2007, p. 100. 
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costs are heavy, then remedial responsibility may fall on the outcome 
responsible agent.53 
3. Causal Responsibility: There are cases where an agent can be the cause of 
someone’s deprivation without being outcome responsible. Although it 
sometimes can be difficult to separate causal responsibility from outcome or 
moral responsibility, it generally occurs when an actor causes an event without 
being able to predict it. For example, if someone turns a corner, accidently 
causing someone to fall, he should make sure that person is unharmed. The 
person who is causally responsible may also be in the best place at the time to 
help the person and therefore remedially responsible.54 
4. Benefit: If an actor has had no causal role, but benefited in the process that 
caused another person harm, such as gaining new resources, he can be 
remedially responsible. He is not responsible for the cause in any of the ways 
identified above, but he is still connected to the situation. It is sufficient that he 
is an innocent beneficiary who would not have benefited unless someone else 
was deprived to make him remedially responsible. There is also a moral reason 
for him to take on remedial responsibility because he was unjustly benefited 
(although he did not behave unjustly). Miller argues that this connection is not 
as strong, since we would not always expect innocent beneficiaries be obliged to 
provide the remedy unless there is no other party able to. However, sometimes 
the person who benefitted is also most capable of remedying the situation 
without significant cost, due to their advantage. Benefitting from a process that 
deprived others creates a special connection. By virtue of this, there is reason to 
be remedially responsible in some cases.55 
5. Capacity: Miller points out that capacity is an obvious way to identify the 
remedially responsible agent. Whichever agent has the greatest capacity to 
remedy the situation may be remedially responsible because of this unique 
position. This may be someone present at the place and time where the harm 
occurs, or the person who has the resources available to provide the remedy. 
Either way, someone who is most capable is in a uniquely advantaged position 
to provide the remedy. This person does not have any other connection to the 
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cause of the situation. Miller argues that when more than one agent is capable, 
the most capable will take on responsibility, or it can be divided between them. 
Miller reasons that responsibility should be divided “from each according to his 
abilities, to each according to his needs”.56 The priority is to aid the person in 
need, so it makes sense to pick the agent most capable. However, Miller points 
out that in regards to the capacity principle, two factors could contradict each 
other: how effective an agent may be at remedying the situation, and how much 
cost the agent must bear to provide it. This may mean choosing either 
effectiveness or cost over the other.57 
6. Community: The last connection to identify remedial responsibility is through 
community ties. This can cover a wide variety of bonds linking people and 
groups, e.g. family, friendship, religion, nationality, etc. Such communitarian 
relationships are independent and prior to the deprivation. These relationships 
involve special obligations to members when one is in need of assistance, so it 
seems obvious to look for agents linked in this way. Miller brings up the 
example of a missing child, where the family, neighbours and local community 
take part in the search, despite having no special capacity or being causally 
responsible for the disappearance. By being connected through community ties 
they have a special relationship and therefore carry the responsibility. Being 
connected through community ties can mean having certain knowledge and 
skills that will help relieve the condition, e.g. language or cultural background. 
In this case community can be connected to capacity, but this is a special case, 
so it makes sense that community is an independent source of remedial 
responsibility.58 
This gives us an explanation of the ways we can identify and allocate remedial 
responsibility. So far this does not determine which criterion should get priority in a 
situation where more than one can apply. At times different criteria can conflict with 
one another. Miller provides two possible explanations to solve this dilemma. Firstly, 
we could rank the criteria in order of priority, and find the agent who best fits the 
strongest criteria. This works best for the first three criteria. If we can identify a morally 
responsible agent, we hold them remedially responsible, if not we move on to outcome 
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responsibility, and failing that, we move on to causal responsibility. However, Miller 
argues that this does not work as well when we consider the last three of the criteria.59 
Moral responsibility can exist to different degrees, and perhaps one of the second three 
would be stronger in this case. If the agent who is morally responsible did not cause the 
situation deliberately but only carelessly or accidently, and an agent with a greater 
capacity to remedy the situation exists, it would make sense to choose capacity over 
moral responsibility. We should not forget that what is of greatest priority is to provide 
the relief to the person who has been harmed, rather than enforcing moral responsibility. 
Miller argues then that it is not plausible to say that the first three criteria, moral, 
outcome and causal responsibility will always carry more weight than capacity, benefit 
and community.60  
 Miller claims that the second way to solve the dilemma would be to challenge 
his idea of remedial responsibility. He argues that we could define the two categories of 
remedial responsibility as firstly of making redress to the wronged party, and secondly, 
bringing aid to a person in need. The first four ways to identify responsibility represent 
making amends for an injustice and the second two ways represent ways to determine 
who should bring aid to the people in need.61 Despite this, Miller defends the idea of 
remedial responsibility as defined above.62  
 In some cases, it may be difficult to establish the different levels of 
responsibility. They may not be so easy to separate and in complex cases it may not be 
apparent how the deprivation came about, and allocating remedial responsibility may be 
equally difficult.63 Miller argues that this is exactly why we need formal mechanisms 
for allocating responsibility. Without these, all parties will find a reason to deflect the 
burden of responsibility onto someone else. Miller argues that when we create such 
mechanisms, we need to consider all the plausible agents, and subsequently assess how 
strongly each is connected to the individual(s) in need. Remedial responsibility can 
either be allocated to the agent who is most closely connected, or be divided between 
agents.64 
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Miller argues that the right to migration cannot be justified unconditionally on 
the grounds of human rights to freedoms alone.65 However, migration may be warranted 
on the basis of other human rights that cannot otherwise be fulfilled. Nevertheless, as 
members of richer nations we can be responsible to the world’s poor, which may entail 
taking in people in need.66 Immigrants who are refused entry to a state should be given 
fair grounds for refusal.67 As we have seen, Miller argues that there are six ways to 
allocate responsibility to remedy a situation. We can be responsible because we are 
causally linked to the situation, but in the case of taking in asylum seekers, states could 
be remedially responsible based on other connections, such as capacity or community 
ties, from the perspective of Miller’s connection theory. 
2.2 Method 
The method used in this paper is content analysis as well as comparison. In Content 
Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities, Ole Holsti defines content analysis as 
“any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying 
specified characteristics of messages”.68 An analysis of the judgments will be used to 
determine their significance in catalysing change. In his book, Content Analysis an 
Introduction to its Methodology, Klaus Krippendorff identifies six questions we need to 
ask when we use the method of content analysis. These questions are: 
1. Which data are analysed? 
2. How are they defined? 
3. What is the population from which they are drawn? 
4. What is the context relative to which the data are analysed? 
5. What are the boundaries of the analysis? 
6. What is the target of the inferences?69 
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To analyse the Dublin-II and Dublin-III, specifically the hierarchy of criteria for 
determining responsibility, the sovereignty clause (art. 3(2)) as well as new the early 
warning mechanism, a comparative method will be used.  I am also going to use the 
method of qualitative content analysis concerning themes such as remedial 
responsibility, responsibility allocation, Mutual Trust, and burden sharing. A central 
theme in this paper is that of responsibility allocation, especially the idea of fair and 
effective burden sharing throughout the EU. Miller’s theory is especially important 
because he argues that nations can be held collectively responsible. The method is to 
analyse the importance of the concept of responsibility and obligations towards asylum 
seekers on a nations territory. 
 I will analyse the concept of responsibility as presented in the court judgements 
of M.S.S. v. Belgium and UK, and in the joint judgment of N.S/M.E. These judgements 
have highlighted the existing problems with the automatic application of the Dublin 
Regulation, and the courts have asserted that this was against obligations towards article 
3 of the ECHR (see chapters 4.1 and 4.2). These judgements demonstrated the 
shortcomings of the Dublin-II. In relation to the concept of responsibility and 
obligations in the judgments, I will also analyse the content of the Dublin-III 
Regulation. Since these judgements, the issues of responsibility and mutual trust, as 
well as burden sharing within the EU have become apparent. The judgments illustrated 
that an automatic application of the Dublin Regulation is not always compatible with 
the ECHR. Therefore I will also use a context analysis method with the Dublin-III, 
especially concerning how the concepts of obligation and responsibility sharing have 
been incorporated, as well as in what ways these might still be lacking. 
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3 Earlier Research 
Both M.S.S. and N.S./M.E. have had a significant impact on the concept of Mutual 
Trust within the EU. Academics writing on the subject of the Dublin Regulation have 
speculated as to what extent these rulings would impact on the drafting of the Dublin-
III. Such articles will be examined more closely in this chapter. Important to note is that 
research on the latest Regulation is still relatively limited due to its recent entry into 
force in 2013. Much of the research on the Dublin-III was on the proposal as well as 
speculating on potential impacts of the judgments. 
Both Patricia Mallia and Violeta Moreno-Lax have written articles on the 
impact of the M.S.S. case, following the verdict in 2011. M.S.S. has been central in 
bringing the inefficiencies of the system to light, and it was hoped that this case would 
have an impact on the drafting of the most recent version of the Regulation. Patricia 
Mallia’s article “Case of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece: A Catalyst in the Re-Thinking 
of the Dublin II Regulation”, discusses the role of the ECtHR judgement in the 
application of the Dublin-II and the court’s role in safeguarding fundamental rights.70 
Mallia argues that the ECtHR has acted as a guarantor of human rights, as well as a 
promoter for change. Additionally, she maintains that this judgement makes it clear that 
the premises of the Dublin system can no longer stand. She argues that a stronger 
mechanism than the sovereignty clause is needed, as the spirit of solidarity is lacking 
between EU Member States.71 
Violeta Moreno-Lax’s article on M.S.S. illustrates the importance of trust in 
the EU, and the risks posed to the non-refoulement principle. However, the Dublin 
Regulation establishes the principle of Mutual Trust within the EU, treating all EU 
states as equal and safe. It has been taken fore granted that all Member States are safe 
and uphold the same level of protection and access to asylum procedures, argues 
Moreno-Lax. M.S.S. has brought to light that in reality this is not the case. She contends 
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that the presumption of safety should not outweigh the realities of the situation, and 
close examination of the particular circumstances in individual cases is necessary.72  
Moreno-Lax argues that the Dublin-II failed to take into account present 
realities. However, she claims that while the changes proposed in 2008 for its successor 
were in the right direction, they were lacking in many respects. She argues that the 
Council and the member states need to create a system that is respectful of asylum-
seekers rights.73 Additionally, Moreno-Lax adds that while rapid transfers have been the 
priority of the Dublin system, this is not realistic, because although Member States have 
relied on the principle of Mutual Trust, there are significant differences in the level of 
protection throughout the EU. Moreno-Lax concludes that it is debatable whether the 
Dublin Regulation as it stands should be considered the cornerstone upon which to 
continue to build the CEAS.74 
Juha Ratio’s chapter “A Few Remarks to Evaluate the Dublin System and the 
Asylum Acquis” in The Future of Asylum in the European Union (2011), discusses the 
proposal for the Dublin-III. Because Ratio’s chapter is from 2011, his analysis includes 
only the proposal for the Dublin-III.75 Ratio argues that the current system needs many 
amendments, although the Commission has shown its intention to make the system 
more effective.76 He claims that different interpretations of the regulation have caused 
confusion and malfunctioning of the system and that there is need for harmonisation and 
common definitions.77 Ratio argues that since the Dublin Regulation was previously 
open to interpretation by national courts, it is vital that the newer Regulation is explicit 
so as to avoid confusion. But interpretations of the court are not enough; a unifying 
legislation is needed. Ratio maintains the need for transparency in the system. He 
concludes that it is ultimately up to the Member States to take further steps. Ratio 
identifies the fear of over-strengthening the federal aspects of the EU as a potential 
obstacle in creating a fair system.78 
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Nika Bacic’s article “Asylum Policy in Europe – The Competences of the 
European Union and Inefficiency of the Dublin System” from 2012 examines the 
proposal for the Dublin-III, for improvements of the responsibility-sharing mechanism. 
Bacic argues that the EU missed the chance to create an “efficient and balanced 
responsibility-sharing system”, providing better protection to asylum seekers.79 
However, Bacic points out that the Council did not accept all the points of the proposal, 
and that the most important aspects of the proposal were rejected.80 Bacic concludes that 
the new regulation does not strengthen the protection for asylum seekers rights.81 
Bacic indentifies two major issues with the proposal for the Dublin-III Firstly, 
the level of protection for human rights is not sufficient by international standards. Full 
and fair examination of asylum claims is not guaranteed. Bacic argues that the EU has 
neglected the harsh impacts procedures can have on asylum seekers. Additionally, Bacic 
claims that the EU relies on the presumption of Mutual Trust, but that much remains to 
be changed before the CEAS truly exists.82  
Secondly, Bacic points out that the new temporary suspense mechanism is not 
sufficient as it does not deal with the fundamental flaws of the system, and will only 
ever be temporarily effective.83 Instead Bacic argues for a fair distribution of Member 
States’ responsibilities, based on the principle of solidarity. Responsibility should be 
based on ties to a particular state, and where these are lacking Bacic advocates for 
freedom of choice of asylum seekers.84 Bacic is in favour of a drastic rewriting of the 
Dublin Regulation.85 He believes that as a whole, the EU is not overburdened, but that 
the problem lies in disproportionate responsibility sharing.86 
Cahtryn Costello’s article “Courting Access to Asylum in Europe: Recent 
Supranational Jurisprudence Explored”, from 2012, discusses the impact of judgements 
such as M.S.S. on the drafting of the new regulation.87 Costello also examines the 
importance of the non-refoulement principle within EU asylum law. She argues that the 
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ECtHR has played a fundamental role in scrutinising border controls and securing the 
right to seek protection. Costello discusses the impact of judgments in prohibiting 
collective expulsions, and contends that the ECtHR’s jurisdictional scope is evolving 
and a potential for improving access to protection does exist.88 
 Costello claims that the Member States have manipulated the conceptions of 
jurisdiction and responsibility in order to hinder access to protection. She argues that 
Member States use “legal fictions” to control their border zones and asylum 
procedures.89 In reference to the Dublin Regulation specifically, Costello upholds that 
states have expanded the area of protection so that transfers are assumed to be safe.  The 
importance of recent court cases reinforces individual Member States’ responsibilities. 
Despite continuing EU legislative reform, Costello argues that a fundamental change to 
the Dublin Regulation is necessary, and deems the Dublin-III a failure.90 
Evelien Brouwer’s article “Mutual Trust and the Dublin Regulation: Protection 
of Fundamental Rights in the EU and the Burden of Proof” discusses both M.S.S. and 
N.S./M.E. Her focus is on the burden of proof during the asylum procedure, and 
whether this rests on the state or the asylum seeker himself.91 Brouwer points out that in 
M.S.S., Belgium was condemned for both direct and indirect refoulement. It was 
indirect because Belgium returned M.S.S. to Greece, where he was threatened with 
expulsion to Afghanistan, and direct because in Greece he was exposed to inhumane 
and degrading treatment.92 Brouwer concludes that an asylum seeker should not be 
expected to bear the burden of proof, and that the transferring state should take on a 
more active role in assessing the receiving state’s asylum procedures and access to 
protection.93  
Additionally, while Belgium argued that there was not enough information 
available to be aware that Greece would not fulfill its obligations, Brouwer supports the 
court’s view that there was adequate information in order to make an informed 
decision.94 In the CJEU case, Brouwer highlights that Member States are obliged to 
assess the consequences of applying Mutual Trust on the non-refoulement principle, 
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prior to transfers to another state.95 She points out that the CJEU does not encourage 
Member States to rely on the principle of Mutual Trust too much.96  
Brouwer concludees that while asylum seekers have some responsibility to 
present evidence of inhumane or degrading treatment where possible, the responsibility 
ultimately lies with the transferring state. M.S.S. demonstrates that it is not always 
possible for asylum seekers to bring forward evidence against a transfer. Brouwer 
concludes that states must make sure that procedural guarantees exist for asylum seekers 
to submit evidence against their transfer.97 She claims that the application of Mutual 
Trust in EU asylum law has created the need for two things: “the further harmonization 
of human rights standards within the EU, but also of the necessity to allow exceptions to 
mutual trust”.98 
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4 Investigation 
4.1 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece 
The M.S.S. judgment is given by the ECtHR and was delivered on the 21st January 
2011. This is a judgment on the Dublin-II Regulation, and the court acknowledges that 
the system is based on establishing an area of “freedom, security and justice open to 
those who, forced by circumstances, legitimately seek protection in the Community”.99 
However, the ECtHR recognizes that the Regulation is based on the presumption that all 
member states respect the principle of non-refoulement, and are safe countries with 
adequate levels of protection and access to asylum procedures, i.e. the principle of 
Mutual Trust.100 The ECtHR views the proposal for an early warning mechanism 
(discussed in chapter 4.5 “The Early Warning Mechanism”) as an important change for 
two reasons: limiting the pressure placed on Member States with a high number of 
applicants, such as border states, and ceasing the transfer of asylum seekers to member 
states without adequate levels of protection.101  
 The ECtHR court points out that in 2007 the European Commission requested 
the CJEU to examine the Greek reception conditions for refugees. The CJEU found that 
Greece had not fulfilled obligations.102 However despite such information, Belgium 
supported its position, claiming that there had been no evidence to discredit the Greek 
asylum system prior to the transfer of M.S.S. The ECtHR presented the argument given 
by the Belgium Aliens Appeal Board in 2009, which is as follows: 
“The general information provided by the applicant in his file mainly concerns the 
situation of aliens seeking international protection in Greece, the circumstances in 
which they are transferred to and received in Greece, the way they are treated and 
the way in which the asylum procedure in Greece functions and is applied. The 
material establish no concrete link showing that the deficiencies reported would 
result in Greece violating its non-refoulement obligation vis-à-vis aliens who, like 
the applicant, were transferred to Greece ... Having regard to the above, the 
applicant has not demonstrated that the enforcement of the impugned decision 
                                                
99 M.S.S., para. 68. 
100 M.S.S., para. 69. 
101 M.S.S., para. 78. 
102 M.S.S., para. 84. 
 
 
 
26 
would expose him to a risk of virtually irreparable harm”.103 
 
Belgium claims that the applicant did not provide enough information to demonstrate 
that Greece would violate its obligations. But to what extent should the applicant be 
responsible for demonstrating that his rights are at risk in the second state? A Member 
State should be able to make itself aware of the conditions for asylum seekers and 
refugees in the second state prior to transfer. Enough information exists that Belgium 
could have been aware of the situation in Greece. Multiple reports have been written by 
NGOs, which the ECtHR lists, and the Belgian Minister of Migration and Asylum 
Policy had also received a letter from the UNHCR in April 2009 detailing the 
circumstances in Greece, and advising against transfer.104 Additional arguments of the 
Belgian Aliens Appeal Board is as follows: 
- Greece is a member of the European Union, governed by the rule of law, a Party 
to the Convention and the Geneva Convention and bound by Community 
legislation in asylum matters; 
- Based on the principle of intra-community trust, it must be presumed that the 
State concerned will comply with its obligations (reference to the Court's case-law 
in K.R.S. v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 32733/08, ECHR 2008-...); 
- In order to reverse that presumption the applicant must demonstrate in concreto 
that there is a real risk of his being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of 
the Convention in the country to which he is being removed; 
- Simple reference to general reports from reliable sources showing that there are 
reception problems or that refoulement is practised or the mere fact that the asylum 
procedure in place in a European Union Member State is defective does not suffice 
to demonstrate the existence of such a risk.105 
 
Belgium relies strongly on the principle of Mutual Trust in its argument. Belgium 
argues that because Greece is a member of the EU, and thus a party to the relevant 
legislation, it must be assumed that the state would comply with its obligations. Without 
additional information from the applicant to disprove this presumption, it is argued by 
the Aliens Appeal Board that there is not enough evidence to demonstrate a risk. The 
ECtHR provides a comprehensive list of NGO reports describing the problems with the 
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asylum procedure in Greece106 and cites evidence that the Belgian Minister of Migration 
and Asylum Policy had received information from the UNHCR, urging them not to 
transfer asylum seekers to Greece: 
“The UNHCR is aware that the Court, in its decision in K.R.S. v. the United 
Kingdom  ... recently decided that the transfer of an asylum seeker to Greece did 
not present a risk of refoulement for the purposes of Article 3 of the Convention. 
However, the Court did not give judgment on compliance by Greece with its 
obligations under international law on refugees. In particular, the Court said 
nothing about whether the conditions of reception of asylum seekers were in 
conformity with regional and international standards of human rights protection, or 
whether asylum seekers had access to fair consideration of their asylum 
applications, or even whether refugees were effectively able to exercise their rights 
under the Geneva Convention. The UNHCR believes that this is still not the case.” 
It concluded: 
 “For the above reasons the UNHCR maintains its assessment of the Greek asylum 
system and the recommendations formulated in its position of April 2008, namely 
that Governments should refrain from transferring asylum seekers to Greece and 
take responsibility for examining the corresponding asylum applications 
themselves, in keeping with Article 3 § 2 of the Dublin Regulation.”107 
 
Belgium had substantial information regarding the situation in Greece prior to 
transferring M.S.S., although the applicant was unable to present the Belgian authorities 
with clear proof that he would face a risk if transferred. The ECtHR maintains that a 
real risk of refoulement by the Greek authorities exists, often indirectly through Turkey. 
The court points out that the authorities have deported asylum seekers collectively, 
sometimes including asylum seekers who have not yet completed their application, or 
whose applications have not yet been processed. It was established that several asylum 
seekers sent to Turkey were returned to Afghanistan with no consideration of asylum 
applications.108  
 The information presented shows that Mutual Trust is not realistic. This 
assumption causes problems and ideally Member States should be obliged to investigate 
the situation in another member state before deciding to transfer. It should not remain 
up to the asylum applicant to provide evidence against transfer, which Belgium argued. 
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An asylum seeker is already in a vulnerable position, and may not have the same access 
to information or procedures to present his claims. The ECtHR reaffirms the absolute 
obligation provided in article 3 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), 
which prohibits inhumane and degrading treatment.109 Both Greece and Belgium were 
in violation of article 3 of the ECHR. Belgium was in violation for transferring an 
asylum seeker to a Member State where he would be exposed to risk of inhumane and 
degrading treatment. Although Member States located most closely to the geographic 
border of the EU experience more pressure than other member states, causing 
significant problems in the reception of asylum seekers, the ECtHR determined that this 
cannot absolve a state of its obligations under article 3 of the ECHR.110 
The ECtHR did not accept the Greek Government’s claim that difficult 
circumstances in the state should be considered when examining the applicant’s 
complaints.111 Like Belgium, Greece argued that much of the responsibility for the 
applicant’s wellbeing lay in his own hands. Greece argued that the applicant should 
have demonstrated an interest in improving his situation, but that his actions showed he 
did not wish to remain in Greece.112 Greece claimed that it was against the principles of 
the ECHR to find in favour of the applicant, because neither the right to accommodation 
or political asylum are guaranteed within. They also feared that the ruling would 
encourage other similar applications, and place excessive positive obligations on the 
state’s welfare system. Additionally, they argued that accommodation is a political not 
judicial decision, and in anyway not an issue for the court to determine.113  
Additionally, evidence from NGOs is presented that as well as being deprived 
of material support from authorities, asylum seekers in Greece are also deprived of the 
right to provide for themselves. The ECtHR considers the extreme poverty that results 
to be treatment contrary to article 3 of the Convention, brought about by the unlawful 
action of the state.114 This is the situation of a large number of asylum seekers in 
Greece, so the court sees no need to question the applicant’s allegations.115 The Greek 
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Government argued that the applicant should have done more to improve his own 
situation, and that ultimately he is responsible.116 
 The court rejected the argument of the Greek Government. According to the 
court, it is not the obligation of the applicant to take action to improve his situation and 
provide for his essential needs.117 The ECtHR is also of the opinion that if the Greek 
Authorities had examined the asylum application immediately, the applicant’s suffering 
could have been greatly limited.118 Contrary to what the Greek Government argued, the 
court considered the inaction of the Government to be an indication of their lack of 
regard for the applicant’s vulnerability, and to be responsible for the situation of the 
applicant.119 
 Aside from article 3 complaints, which are the main focus in the judgment, the 
applicant had also complained that there was no effective remedy in Greek law for 
article 2 and article 3. Article 12 of the ECHR states that: 
Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated 
shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the 
violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.120 
 
The applicant also complained that the asylum procedure of Greece was so insufficient 
that he faced the risk of refoulement to his country, without a proper examination of his 
application, violating both articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR. Article 2 states that: 
1. Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of 
his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his 
conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.121 
 
The applicant alleged that his fears were real and constituted threat to his personal 
security and freedoms. Prior to fleeing Afghanistan, he had escaped an attempt on his 
life from the Taliban due to his work as an interpreter for international air force. After 
his departure, his contacts back home advised him not to return, as the situation 
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remained insecure.122 The applicant had very real fears, and therefore he had applied for 
asylum in Greece.123 
 However, despite his situation, the Greek Government argued that he did not 
suffer any of the consequences of an inadequate asylum system. It was argued that he 
could not be considered a victim as such under the Convention.124 The Government 
argued that the authorities had followed the correct procedure, but that the applicant was 
negligent. In support of this, the Government argued that the applicant remained in 
Greece and was never deported, even though he had attempted to leave the country.125 
They argued that the applicant’s claims were unsupported and that Greek legislation is 
in line with international asylum law, including the non-refoulement principle.126 The 
Greek Government did confirm that the authorities had not yet examined the application 
for asylum.127 
 The court concluded that the Belgian authorities should have refrained from 
transferring the applicant, and should have investigated the situation in Greece. The 
ECtHR judges Belgium’s actions to be incompliant with its international obligations. 
Additionally, the ECtHR maintains that the presumption that protection levels in 
Member States are equal should not apply in this case.128 The court also discredits 
Belgium’s argument that because the applicant failed to voice his fears of being 
transferred during his interview that the government was not aware of the situation and 
risks present if he was transferred.129 The ECtHR concluded that the Belgian authorities 
were aware of the situation, and that in general an applicant for asylum should never be 
expected to bear the entire burden of proof. The ECtHR stated that, “in spite of the few 
examples of application of the sovereignty clause produced by the Government, which, 
incidentally, do not concern Greece, the Aliens Office systematically applied the Dublin 
Regulation to transfer people to Greece without so much as considering the possibility 
of making an exception.”130  
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 The objections given by the Greek Government were rejected. The court held 
that there had been a violation of article 3, because of the detention conditions, the 
living conditions, as well as the risk of his expulsion to Afghanistan. The court also 
rejected the argument given by the Belgian government.131 This judgment is especially 
important as much of Belgium’s argument had relied on the presumption of mutual 
trust: that since Greece is a Member State of the European Union, it must be presumed 
that the state would comply with their obligations. The judgment rejects the argument of 
Belgium, and in essence this rejects the idea that Mutual Trust can continue to exist 
between Member States. 
4.2 N.S. v the UK and M.E. and others v Ireland 
The N.S./M.E. judgment of 21 December 2011 is a CJEU court judgment. The 
judgment concerns two separate cases: N.S., who claimed asylum in the United 
Kingdom, and M.E and others, who claimed asylum in Ireland. This judgment came 
after M.S.S. and is more concise. In N.S./M.E., the CJEU refers to M.S.S.132 The most 
significant different between M.S.S. and N.S./M.E. is that the ECtHR judgment was 
made after Belgium had transferred the applicant to Greece, and penalises the two states 
for their unlawful actions. Whereas the CJEU judgment was made after the authorities 
of the UK and Ireland had referred a list of questions on the application of the Dublin-II 
to the court, in reference to asylum seekers whose transfer to Greece has been halted.133 
 This concern of the judgment is the interpretation of article 3(2) of the Dublin-
II Regulation, and the fundamental rights of the EU.134 Article 3(2) provides that each 
Member State may examine an application for asylum even if it is not responsible 
according to the Regulation.135 Both the UK and Ireland referred questions to the CJEU 
for preliminary ruling after the asylum seekers argued there was a real risk their rights 
would be violated if returned to Greece. The Court of Appeal (England and Wales) 
referred seven questions to the CJEU for preliminary ruling, which dealt with two main 
issues.136 The first issue was whether a Member State is required to take responsibility 
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for processing a claim for asylum if a risk exists of violating the fundamental rights of 
and asylum seeker when transferred.137 The second issue referred was whether the duty 
of a Member State to observe EU fundamental rights ceases when the asylum seeker is 
transferred to the state responsible under the Regulation.138  
 The High Court of Ireland referred two questions to the CJEU for preliminary 
ruling. The first question was whether a transferring Member State is obliged to assess 
the compliance of the receiving Member State with its human rights obligations under 
EU law.139 The second question was if the receiving Member State were found not to be 
in compliance with its obligations, would the transferring Member State be obliged to 
accept responsibility for the application under article 3(2) of the Regulation?140  
 The court replied that article 3(2) grants Member States a discretionary 
power.141 The court highlights that the Regulation was created in order to speed up the 
asylum process in the interest of both asylum seekers and Member States.142 For the 
purpose of this, the principle Mutual Trust is understandable.143 However, the court 
admits that in practice there are major operational problems with this.144 If there were 
cause to believe that there were substantial flaws with a Member State’s asylum system, 
then the transfer would be incompatible.145 The court answers that if it is not possible to 
transfer an asylum seeker to the Member State responsible because of risk to the asylum 
seeker’s fundamental rights, then the asylum seeker shall be transferred to the next state 
that can be identified as responsible under the Regulation.146 However, if no other state 
can be identified as responsible, then the Member State in which the asylum seeker is 
present must itself examine the application.147  
 The court points out that if the Regulation were to require complete Mutual 
Trust, it would undermine the safeguards indented to ensure compliance with 
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fundamental rights by the Member States.148 The court concludes that EU law prohibits 
the conclusive presumption that the Member State identified as responsible under the 
Regulation observes its fundamental human rights obligations.149 This assumption is 
unrealistic because in practice, flaws and complications are bound to occur when a 
uniform asylum system is placed on all Member States. Throughout the judgment, the 
concepts of Mutual Trust and responsibility are reiterated. Additionally, solidarity 
between Member States is a concept that comes up in the judgment. The court reminds 
us of the importance of solidarity in the asylum system, and “promoting a balance of 
efforts between Member States”.150 Additionally, the court reiterates that “asylum 
policy and its implementation are to be governed by the principle of solidarity and fair 
sharing of responsibility, including its financial implications, between the Member 
States”.151 
 The conclusion of M.S./N.E. is that an asylum seeker cannot be transferred to 
the Member State responsible for examining his application if there is a real risk that he 
will suffer inhumane and degrading treatment there. In this case the applicants opposed 
their transfer to Greece because they were at risk of such treatment. The court highlights 
that the CEAS is based on Mutual Trust: the presumption that other Member States 
comply with their obligations and have the same level of protection, but this is not 
definite. In practice, other Member State’s asylum systems may be flawed. The court 
concludes that there are substantial grounds to believe that an asylum seeker transferred 
to Greece would face a risk of inhumane or degrading treatment. 
4.3 The Sovereignty Clause 
Article 3(2) of the Dublin Regulation has been commonly known as the “sovereignty 
clause”.152 This clause is used as an exception where a Member State may choose to 
process an asylum claim, even if it is not the state responsible under the Regulation. In 
February 2013, the European Refugee Fund recommended Member States to respect the 
sovereignty clause as a duty when a transfer is incompatible with obligations under 
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international law.153 However, the sovereignty clause is a discretionary clause, which in 
practice is rarely applied by the Member States.154 Under the Dublin-II this clause 
imposed no actual obligation, and was by no means strong enough to prevent violations 
of asylum seekers’ fundamental rights. According to Agnès Hurwitz in The Collective 
Responsibility of States to Protect Refugees (2009), the sovereignty clause under the 
Dublin-II was useful where the Convention was not. However, she claims that the 
clause was much too extensive, which demonstrated the failures of the system to fairly 
and effectively allocate responsibility.155 The sovereignty clause under article 3(2) in the 
Dublin-II reads as follows: 
By way of derogation from paragraph 1, each Member State may examine an application 
for asylum lodged with it by a third-country national, even if such examination is not its 
responsibility under the criteria laid down in this Regulation. In such an event, that 
Member State shall become the Member State responsible within the meaning of this 
Regulation and shall assume the obligations associated with that responsibility. Where 
appropriate, it shall inform the Member State previously responsible, the Member State 
conducting a procedure for determining the Member State responsible or the Member 
State, which has been requested to take charge of or take back the applicant.156 
 
This paragraph does not enforce any positive obligation to guard against asylum seekers 
being transferred to a Member State where their rights are at risk. It does not create any 
positive obligation for states to take over responsibility for an asylum application. 
Additionally, this paragraph did not create any positive obligation for states to assess the 
conditions for asylum seekers in the second state before transfers. However, the updated 
paragraph has been rewritten and amended, and reflects the understanding that asylum 
procedures may not be adequate by virtue of EU membership alone. The sovereignty 
clause of the current Regulation, article 3(2) in the Dublin-III, reads as follows: 
Where no Member State responsible can be designated on the basis of the criteria listed in 
this Regulation, the first Member State in which the application for international 
protection was lodged shall be responsible for examining it.  
 
Where it is impossible to transfer an applicant to the Member State primarily designated 
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as responsible because there are substantial grounds for believing that there are systemic 
flaws in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions for applicants in that 
Member State, resulting in a risk of inhumane or degrading treatment within the meaning 
of Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the determining 
Member State shall continue to examine the criteria set out in Chapter III in order to 
establish whether another Member State can be designated as responsible.  
 
Where the transfer cannot be made pursuant to this paragraph to any Member State 
designated on the basis of the criteria set out in Chapter III or to the first Member State 
with which the application was lodged, the determining Member State shall become the 
Member State responsible.157 
 
The new paragraph now imposes positive obligations on Member States to examine an 
application for asylum when an asylum seeker cannot be transferred to the responsible 
state, and when no other state can be designated as responsible. This provides 
exceptions to Mutual Trust, as there may be situations where there are fundamental 
flaws in the asylum seeker posing risks to his rights. But it is debatable whether this 
new clause is sufficient to prevent transfers to states where asylum procedures are 
inadequate. The clause itself does not impose any positive obligation to assess the 
asylum system in the receiving sate. The clause prohibits transfers where there are 
“substantial grounds for believing that there are systemic flaws in the asylum 
procedure”.158 However, “substantial grounds for believing” does not necessarily mean 
that a state is obliged to actively investigate the standards of a receiving state and be 
assured that they are adequate prior to transferring. However, this clause is a step in the 
right direction.  
 One other difference with article 3(2) is the addition of what was previously 
article 13 in the Dublin-II. The first paragraph of article 3(2) now gives the 
responsibility to the first Member State where an application for international protection 
was lodged, when no other state can be determined as responsible. One of the 
fundamental flaws of the Dublin system since it was put into place has been the 
allocation of responsibility to the first Member State an asylum seeker enters and makes 
an application for asylum to. The majority of asylum seekers enter the EU through same 
Member States, Italy, Malta, Greece and Cyprus etc. These states geographically make 
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up the border to the EU. Designating responsibility this way gives a small number of 
Member States the majority of the responsibility, without attention to their capacity to 
take in and host asylum seekers. 
 
4.4 Hierarchy of Criteria 
The mechanism with the Dublin Regulation for allocating responsibility to Member 
States is the Hierarchy of Criteria. Under this section, (articles 5-14 in the Dublin-II, 
and articles 7-15 in the Dublin-III) the criteria for allocating responsibility are listed in 
order of priority. The order of priority of each criterion is uniform in all situations. The 
applicable criterion that is highest up in the list identifies the responsible state. From the 
Convention to the current Regulation, the hierarchy of criteria has not changed much. 
Bellow is a summarised version of the hierarchy in the Dublin-II, followed by a 
summarised version of the changes to the hierarchy in the Dublin-III. 
 
Hierarchy of Criteria in the Dublin-II: 
1. Unaccompanied minors: If the asylum seeker is an unaccompanied minor, then 
the Member State responsible is where his family is legally residing, or if there 
is none, the state where he has applied for asylum.159   
2. Family members residing as refugees: If the asylum seeker has a family member 
residing as a refugee in one of the Member States, then that Member State is 
responsible for examining the application.160 
3. Family members whose application is pending: If the asylum seeker has a family 
member whose application for asylum is still pending decision in one of the 
Member States, then that Member State is responsible for examining the 
application.161 
4. Residence permits and visas: If the asylum seeker has obtained a valid residence 
permit or holds a valid visa document, then the Member State responsible for 
issuing the document will take on responsibility for the asylum application. If 
the asylum seeker has more than one residence permit or visa, then the Member 
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State issuing the document with the longest period of residency shall take the 
responsibility, or with the latest expiry date if the visas/permits are for the same 
length of time.162 
5. Irregular entry or stay: If an asylum seeker has irregularly crossed the border to a 
Member State, through land, sea or air from a third country, the Member State 
first entered is responsible for examining the application. This responsibility 
ceases after 12 months. If an asylum seeker who has entered a Member State 
irregularly has previously been living in another Member State for at least 5 
months, then that Member State will take on the responsibility for processing the 
application.163 
6. Visa waived entry: If a third-country national enters a Member State where his 
need for a visa is waived, then that Member State will be responsible for 
examining the application.164 
7. Application in international transit area of an airport: If the application for 
asylum is submitted in the transit area of an airport of a Member State, that state 
is responsible.165 
8. If no Member State can be designated as responsible on the basis of the above 
criteria, then the fist Member State where the application for asylum was made 
is the state responsible for examining it.166 
9. Family procedure: If several family members have lodged applications for 
asylum in the same Member State, then the responsibility for examining the 
applications goes to the Member State which would be responsible for the 
largest number of family members according to the criteria above. Otherwise the 
Member State responsible for the oldest of the asylum seekers according to the 
criteria shall take on the responsibility for the whole family.167 
 
Hierarchy of Criteria in the Dublin-III: 
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1. Unaccompanied minors: This criterion has not changed much. Added to this 
criterion is the issue of married minors, where the spouse is not legally present. 
The Member State responsible in this case is that where a family member or 
adult responsible for the minor is legally present. Additionally, if there is a 
relative to the minor’s family that is able to take care of him legally present in a 
Member State, that state shall accept responsibility. Reuniting a minor with 
family members or relatives is decided on the basis of what is in the minor’s best 
interest. If no family or relative exists, then the Member State responsible is that 
where the minor has lodged his application for asylum.168 
2. Family members who are beneficiaries of international protection: The main 
change to this criterion is that if an asylum seeker has family members in a 
Member State who are beneficiaries of international protection (not just refugee 
status as previously), that Member State shall take on responsibility to process 
the application.169 
3. Family members who are applicants for international protection: This criterion 
remains the same.170 
4. Family procedure: This criterion remains the same, however it has been given a 
higher ranking in the Dublin-III. In the Dublin-II it was the 9th and final 
criterion, but in the Dublin-III it holds the 4th position.171 
5. Residence documents or visas: The content of the article remains the same.172 
6. Irregular entry or stay: This criterion has not been changed.173 
7. Visa waived entry: This criterion remains the same.174 
8. Application in international transit area of an airport: This criterion has not been 
changed.175 
 
The hierarchy in the Dublin-III is largely the same as it was in the Dublin-II. Not many 
changes have been made, and it still retains the same fundamental structure that was the 
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basis for much criticism. There are a few small changes, for example under the criterion 
for unaccompanied minors, some specifications have been added. The main change in 
the hierarchy is under family members. A Member State is now responsible for an 
asylum application if the applicant has a family member legally residing in its territory 
who is a beneficiary of international protection, not just of refugee status as previously.  
Under the Dublin-II this criterion was only valid if family members had refugee 
protection. Another significant change is the ranking of the criterion for multiple family 
members applying at the same time. This criterion is now 4th in the hierarchy, instead of 
being 9th (last) as it was previously. 
In the revised hierarchy, the criterion that was under article 13 in the Dublin-II 
has now been removed. This article read, “Where no Member State responsible for 
examining the application for asylum can be designated on the basis of the criteria listed 
in this Regulation, the first Member State with which the application for asylum was 
lodged shall be responsible for examining it”. This article has now been moved to art. 
3(2), and is part of the “Sovereignty clause” in the Dublin-III. This does not impact the 
hierarchy much; it is the paragraph under this that makes a difference (see Chapter 4.3). 
 The Hierarch of Criteria is essentially a mechanism for identifying remedial 
responsibility. In Miller’s theory of national responsibility, he outlined the six ways we 
can identify and allocate remedial responsibility (see Chapter 2). Remedial 
responsibility means the responsibility and agent bears to remedy the situation, and to 
bring aid to a person in need. The six ways Miller identifies are all ways the agent can 
be connected to the situation and be held responsible to supply the remedy. Miller 
argues that the aim of allocating remedial responsibility is not to reprimand an agent for 
his actions, but that the justification is to supply the remedy to the person in need. What 
this means is that the actor held remedially responsible should be most capable of 
supplying an effective remedy. 
 One positive thing about the hierarchy is that it does give some weight to 
community ties in the way of family. However, I would argue that this could be 
expanded to include other ties. The irregular entry or stay criterion is one that is used 
often and is not linked in any way to a state being capable of supplying an effective 
remedy. The state is geographically located in a way that makes it most accessible to 
third country nationals irregularly entering the EU. This should not make a state 
responsible, as it does not mean the state would be more capable of supplying the 
remedy, other than the asylum seeker being physically present on its territory. National 
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responsibility means sharing the burden in a fair way, and not deflecting it elsewhere, 
placing unrealistic burdens on states less capable of taking on responsibility. 
4.5 The Early Warning Mechanism 
In the new Dublin Regulation “A mechanism for early warning, preparedness and crisis 
management” has been added as article 33. This mechanism is intended as preparation 
for and prevention of similar situations to that of Greece occurring in the future. The 
European Asylum Support Office (EASO), an agency of the EU, gathers information on 
the CEAS, which it presents to the Commission. If this information makes it clear that 
there is a risk that the application of the Dublin Regulation may be placing too much 
pressure on a particular Member State’s asylum system or that there are issues with the 
asylum system, the commission will draw up a preventive action plan for that state. A 
state may also draw up its own action plan and present it to the commission.176  
Under article 33, the Member State whose asylum system is affected is obliged 
to take all measures to deal with the situation and ensure that deficiencies are identified 
and addressed before the system deteriorates.177 If the preventive action plan is not 
effective, or if there is risk that the asylum system of the Member State may develop 
into a crisis, the Member State may be requested to draw up and implement a crisis 
management action plan.178 Throughout the process of prevention and crisis 
management, the Council closely monitors the situation. The final sentence of article 33 
states that “the European Parliament and the Council may, throughout the entire 
process, discuss and provide guidance on any solidarity measures as they deem 
appropriate.”179 
The article does not provide information on what the solidarity measures may 
entail. Additionally, article 33 is a step forward as it does admit that not all Member 
States may be able to handle the pressures being placed on their asylum system. It also 
makes it clear that not all Member States necessarily have the same level of protection 
or access to protection. However, this article does not provide any information on when 
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transfers to a particular Member State may be suspended or what steps should be taken 
as preventive action or as crisis management. 
 
 
 
 
42 
5 Analysis 
Throughout this thesis I have focused on two significant judgments on the Dublin-II, 
M.S.S. and N.S./M.E. The M.S.S. ruling essentially implies the end to Mutual Trust 
among the EU Member States. This case illustrates very clearly that assuming Mutual 
Trust is not feasible in practice and that it is unrealistic to expect that all Member States, 
each with their own individual histories and present day situations, have the same level 
of protection. The addition to article 3(2), the sovereignty clause, in the Dublin-III 
reflects this. It is now admitted within the Regulation that not all Member States have 
adequate levels of protection, and prohibits Member States from transferring to such 
states. It should never be assumed prior to transferring that other Member States 
automatically comply with international obligations. N.S./M.E. is also important 
because the judgment highlights the fact that the Regulation has been open to 
interpretation, and that there are different interpretations of its application. In the 
Dublin-II, it was not clear when there was an obligation to apply the sovereignty clause. 
Both the verdicts of M.S.S. and N.S./M.E. highlight the issue of allocating 
responsibility for asylum applications amongst EU member states. The Dublin 
Regulation until recently has considered Member States as equal in regards to 
conditions for asylum seekers. The hierarchy of criteria in the Dublin Regulation has 
been responsible for distributing a disproportionate amount of the responsibility to 
states that are geographically make up the border of the EU. These states are less able to 
support an increasing population and to provide the level of protection needed for 
asylum seekers. It is both unrealistic and also not in the spirit of solidarity to expect 
these states to be responsible for a large proportion of asylum seekers. Determining 
responsibility should ideally be based on the needs of the asylum seeker and the ability 
of the Member State to cope with an influx of migrants. However, using the first state 
an asylum seeker lodged an application in as a criterion for responsibility does not take 
consideration of the capability of the state or needs of the asylum seeker. 
Considering the validity of speculations on the impact of the cases is an 
interesting issue to examine after the new Regulation has already come into force. Such 
articles have focused primarily on what role the court has played in securing human 
rights for asylum seekers and how this impacted the recent rewriting of the Regulation. 
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While there is a new paragraph strengthening the rights of asylum seekers, the new 
Regulation is still based on the same hierarchy of criteria. While some of the additions 
and amendments are changes in a positive direction, the fundamental issue of the 
Regulation has still not been dealt with. The sovereignty clause is a positive addition to 
the Regulation, however the early warning mechanism is somewhat broad and lacks 
clear guidelines on how to deal in the face of a crisis in a Member State’s asylum 
system.  
As a union, the Member States of the EU have a collective responsibility and 
should share it in the manner of solidarity. I would argue that of Miller’s connection 
theory, capacity and community are the most applicable ways to allocate remedial 
responsibility for asylum seekers. It would be much more in the spirit of solidarity if the 
responsibility to process claims for asylum seekers were shared according to capacity. 
Additionally, the interests of the asylum seeker are important too and community ties 
should also be considered. Most of the time Member States cannot be held directly 
responsible for the situation of the asylum seeker. In cases where they can be, it is not 
always easy to determine exactly how they are. For example, in M.S.S. the applicant 
had worked as an interpreter for an international air force, which was the reason for the 
attempt on his life by the Taliban. However, it is not easy to establish who in particular 
is responsible for his condition, other than the international community as a whole. So 
in this case, in the spirit of solidarity it makes sense for the most capable Member State 
to accept responsibility or any state, to which he has ties. 
 National responsibility is important, as Member States often avoid taking on a 
fair share of the burden, and instead rely on the article which allocates the responsibility 
to the Member State which has been the first point of entry. This allows them to transfer 
that responsibility to states closer to the border, with fewer resources. The articles that I 
have looked at in this paper have highlighted that the redraft of the Dublin Regulation is 
disappointing. Some of the amendments are in the right direction, but in the long run a 
drastic change is needed. It is not reasonable to continue to place pressures on the state 
that was the first point of entry into the EU. It may be a common misconception that as 
a whole the EU is overburdened and that the number of asylum seekers is too many. 
However, Bacic argued that the EU is not overburdened. The problem, he argues, is in 
the disproportionate responsibility sharing. And it is in this that we need the most 
significant change, and to shift over to a spirit of solidarity between Member States. 
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 Brouwer claimed that while we need a harmonization of human rights 
standards within the EU, more realistically we need exceptions to Mutual Trust. The 
Dublin-III does provide exceptions to this. However, Costello is more harsh, deeming 
the Dublin-III a failure without a fundamental change to the system as a whole. Ratio 
has argued that the Regulation was previously open to interpretation and that what is 
needed is harmonisation and common definitions. In the case of N.S./M.E., it became 
apparent that certain articles of the Regulation could be interpreted differently. While 
article 3(2) has been made more specific, I would argue that the Regulation lacks 
specific indications of when to apply some of the clauses. Ultimately, as Mallia argues, 
the premise of the Dublin Regulation can no longer stand without the spirit of solidarity 
between EU Member States. She claims that without solidarity between Member States, 
a stronger mechanism than the sovereignty clause is needed. 
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6 Conclusion 
The Dublin Regulation has been the focus of much criticism over the years. The third 
version of this document came into force in 2013. After the cases of M.S.S. and 
N.S./M.E., the flaws of the system became blindingly obvious. These could no longer 
be ignored, and we were made aware that essentially, Mutual Trust is a myth. It is 
impossible to assume that all states have the same level of protection standards and 
access to asylum procedures on the sole virtue of membership in the EU. To do so 
would be naïve. Yet Mutual Trust has been the principle on which the Dublin 
Regulation inexplicitly relies on. In order for the hierarchy of criteria to work, the 
Dublin Regulation assumes Mutual Trust. This is because the criteria are always given 
the same weight of importance no matter the situation. The Dublin Regulation does not 
give importance to individual circumstances.  
However, levels of protection and access to asylum procedures are certainly 
not uniform between the Member States. But the Dublin Regulation fails to take into 
account the capacity of individual states. Member States do not all have the same 
capability of being remedially responsible for asylum seekers. For some states with 
fewer resources, the cost of such a responsibility is a lot higher. It is unrealistic to 
allocate remedial responsibility on the sole virtue that a Member State was the entry 
point into the EU for an asylum seeker. This type of connection does not give a state 
any advantage to provide the remedy; in fact it increases the burden of it, as the majority 
of asylum seekers enter the EU through the same few states.  
It has often been thought that the influx of asylum seekers to the EU is 
overburdening all of the Member States. However, this is a misconception. As a union, 
the EU is not actually overburdened: the problem lies in disproportionate burden 
sharing between Member States. A larger problem is created when too much pressure is 
put on specific states’ asylum systems, as they risk collapsing. An immediate crisis in a 
Member State’s asylum system, especially one that is an entry point into the EU, would 
be a bigger burden on the EU as a whole than proportionate responsibility sharing in the 
spirit of solidarity to begin with. While new clauses and mechanisms are added to the 
Dublin Regulation in order to deal with situations of acute crisis, the most effective 
long-term solution for prevention would be to distribute the responsibility 
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proportionately between Member States, taking into account various factors such as 
capacity and community ties.  
The criterion providing for responsibility allocation to the Member State of 
entry into the EU remains intact in the Regulation. This criterion is a fundamental flaw 
within a system that cannot be rectified until it is removed. However, this criterion 
remained through the three versions of the Dublin Regulation. It is unlikely that such a 
fundamental change to the system will occur in the near future. The two judgments 
examined in this paper have in effect highlighted the myth of Mutual Trust. The Dublin-
III does not take fore granted that all Member States have adequate levels of protection 
as the Dublin-II did. The conclusion of this investigation is that while the Dublin-III has 
some positive changes, its fundamental flaw has remained. Responsibility sharing 
between Member States will never be proportionate and in the spirit of solidarity until 
this is rectified.  
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